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1 Introduction
The observation that labor contracts are restricted in terms of the length of workweeks
has long been a component of economic modeling. There are many studies that analyze
how labor supply is a¤ected when workers cannot choose how much to work but are
limited to a number of wage-hours o¤ers (see for example Oi,1962; Mo¢ tt, 1982; Barzel,
1973). This paper studies the labor supply and demand behavior in an economy where
such restrictions are created by labor market inexibilities and pronounced through the
interaction of these inexibilities with a minimum wage regulation.
Most studies on the e¤ects of the minimum wage concentrate on changes in the margin
of employment. Analyses are usually conducted to reveal either the percentage of workers
losing their jobs when the minimum wage increases or the percentage of individuals who
are motivated by higher wages to obtain a job. Katz and Krueger (1992), Card and
Krueger (1994), and Campoliati, Gunderson, and Riddell (2006) look at the e¤ects of
the minimum wage on employment by part-time and full-time positions. However, to
my knowledge, other than Ozturk (2008), who uses aggregate time-series data for OECD
countries, there is no other study that analyzes the employment e¤ects of a minimum
wage regulation by studying its e¤ect on the hours distribution of jobs and capturing its
negative impact on the availability of exible, part-time job options in inexible labor
markets.
Another shortcoming in this literature is that the majority of the empirical evidence
comes from US and provides very few economically signicant e¤ects on employment,
either positive or negative. This is not a surprising result because, as has been noted
(for example by Kennan, 1998) before, the minimum wage has never been high enough
to create a signicant e¤ect in the US . Existing U.S. base models in the literature can-
not be expected to explain the workings of minimum wages in developing countries as
Lemos(2009) points out, as the developing world di¤ers signicantly with respect to the
role of the minimum wage in the labor market and also the macroeconomic structures
and laws surrounding it. For example, in many developing countries, the minimum wage
is set as a living wage for a family, not for an individual, as the main target group is
the male breadwinner. Thus, the employment e¤ects would be expected to have di¤erent
dimensions than in developed countries. In addition, in many countries the indexation
of minimum wages is automatic, unlike the US, which always maintains the relative im-
portance of minimum wages, thereby restricting the employers ability to adjust for and
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mitigate the e¤ects of the minimum wage.
Not only developing countries but also female labor supply is overlooked in most previ-
ous minimum-wage studies, which usually examine the impacts on teenage employment.
Furthermore, even though there is a vast literature on female labor supply, structural
modeling of the labor-supply behavior of women, especially in an international context, is
very rare. Women behave di¤erently than men in the labor market, mostly due to their
traditional roles as homemakers. Because they have the option to dedicate their time to
the home, it is easier for women than for men to decide not to work in the labor mar-
ket, especially when the available jobs are restrictive in terms of the hours they can work.
Moreover, given the majority of the female workforce is characterized as "low-productivity
labor" in many developing countries, changes in minimum wages that cause restrictions
in the hours distribution of available jobs are more like to reduce female employment
compared to any other group. Thus, one will expect to see larger e¤ects of the minimum
wage on employment for women, especially in developing countries.
Another important factor in this dynamic is labor-market inexibility. The exibil-
ity of labor markets became central to policymaking, especially in Europe after several
OECD reports and inuential economic work that suggested that the high unemployment
of Europe was due to the strong employment-protection laws in these countries. The
e¤ect of institutional inexibilities on employment has been studied extensively in the
European context; for example, research by Bertola (1990) and Blanchard and Jimeno
(1995) attempts to explain the high unemployment rates in Europe. Additionally, Blan-
chard (2005) provides a detailed review of the history of unemployment in Europe and the
inexibility literature that market inexibility inspired. In most of the studies reviewed,
the minimum wage is not modeled separately but aggregated in a general measure of
labor-market exibility, and employment e¤ects are analyzed with macro data. Using
individual-level data, the present paper isolates the minimum wage in Turkey and stud-
ies its e¤ects on individuals labor-market participation decisions when combined with
"other" labor-market "inexibilities.
Given the gaps in the literature described above, this paper contributes to the minimum-
wage literature by modeling minimum wage as a potential source of such work restrictions
when high labor costs exist. Moreover, this paper contributes to the literature by ana-
lyzing the minimum-wage e¤ects in a developing country. The main claim of the present
paper is that it is prohibitively expensive for rms to employ workers for short workweeks
at a minimum wage when the labor market is inexible due to xed employment costs.
When employers o¤er contracts that specify a minimum number of hours to be worked, it
results in a shift in the distribution of hours for the available jobs in the market, restrict-
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ing the number of part-time jobs. Part-time jobs play a crucial role in the labor-market
participation decisions of marginal workers, especially women, because women may prefer
exible schedules. Part-time jobs in many cases serve as a gateway to full-time jobs and
ease the transition from household production to market work. Thus, when employment
costs are high, a minimum wage makes it less likely that marginal workers will enter and
stay in the labor market.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the characteristics of
Turkeys female labor force and labor market. The third section introduces the theoretical
model. The fourth section gives the econometric specication of the model. Section 5
provides the description of the data used, details of the estimation, and the estimation
results. Section 6 provides counterfactual simulations and discusses policy implications.
Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Female Labor Force Participation in Turkey
Over the last 50 years, the labor-force participation rate of Turkish women has declined
signicantly and remained unexpectedly low, especially in urban areas. Approximately 72
percent of women participated in the labor force in 1955, but only 23 percent participated
in 2005. Moreover, in 2005, the participation rate was only 18 percent among urban
women (SIS HLFS, 2005). Over this same period, female participation rates, on average,
doubled worldwide and almost tripled for married women in most countries going through
social changes comparable to those of Turkey.
The initial drop in the female labor-force participation rate in Turkey has been at-
tributed to the massive urbanization of the workforce after the 1950s. Before then, small-
scale, family-level agriculture had been employing nearly all of the women in rural areas.
Given the distinction between household duties and work is blurred in agriculture, it is
easier for rural women to meet the conditions to be considered employed. It has been
argued that when women move to cities, they cannot nd a place for themselves in the
labor force of urban Turkey (Dayioglu, 1998; Ozar, 1996; Tunali, 1997). In cities, market
work and household duties are incompatible. Hence, women have to concentrate on one
of them. Most of these women have little human capital, so they are employable only in
marginal jobs. Faced with this, most choose not to participate in the workforce.
Even though this misplaced-marginal-worker theory can explain the initial decline in
female employment, it fails to capture the persistence of the low presence of females in the
labor market. The continued decline in the participation rate is unexpected because the
social status of women has improved signicantly over the past decades. Through vast
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public programs, increased emphasis on compulsory schooling, and the introduction of
secularity in all aspects of social life, the educational attainment of women has increased
substantially. This has been accompanied by a considerable drop in the total fertility rate
(from 6.6 births per women in the 1950s to 3.3 in 1988 and 2.16 in 2001) and a gradual
increase in the average age of rst marriage and age of rst birth (Shorter, 1995). Previous
empirical evidence implies that these changes should lead to a higher female labor-force
participation rate (Mincer, 1985; Schultz, 1990; Goldin 1995).
The lack of responsiveness of employment levels to the changing social and demographic
environment is not the only striking feature of the Turkish female labor force. Even
though employment levels are lowonly 24 percent of women between ages 15 to 65 were
employed in Turkey in 2008, compared to 65 percent in the United States, 59 percent
in the European Union, and about 60 percent for OECD countries excluding Turkey
(OECD, 2008)Turkish women supply long hours when they do work; Part-time job
holders constitute mere 6 percent of all female workers in Turkey(OECD 2007). In OECD
countries, on average 28 percent of all female workers work part time, and this ratio reaches
as high as 60 percent in some countries (OECD 2007).
This paper proposes that Turkish women have a low rate of labor-force participation
due to the extreme scarcity of part-time jobs, resulting from the constraints on hours
implied by the interaction of the minimum wage and market inexibility. This paper
shows that, indeed, if there had been fewer restrictions on work hours, the Turkish female
labor-force participation rate would have been about 6 times higher over the years of the
survey period analyzed in this paper (1988-1999).
This e¤ect may seem very high; however, given the fact that the minimum wage is
binding for a signicant portion of workers, it is a plausible estimate. According to the
Pension Insurance Agencys (SSK) statistics, about 43 percent of all registered workers are
employed at the minimum wage. This corresponds to about 3 million workers. Moreover,
Turkey has a large informal labor market. Prior research estimates that during the data
period under study, informal labor was between 7% and 34 % (depending on the denition
used) in urban areas (Bulutay and Tasti, 2004). Including these workers brings the
number of workers directly a¤ected by the minimum wage regulation up to about 5.5
million workers. In the present paper, employment is dened as either employment in
the formal sector or employment in nonmarginal jobs (part-time jobs are not considered
marginal). Because the papers purpose is to explain the failure to utilize the increased
productivity of women in nonmarginal jobs by making exible hours available, this is a
reasonable assumption.
Over the years of the survey period analyzed in this paper (1988-1999), the minimum
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wage changed 12 times, doubling in nominal value in most cases. However, with the high
ination Turkey was experiencing at the time, the real value of the currency has more of
a wavy look for the seven biannual data points used in the present study. In U.S. Dollar
terms (using the 1988 TL/Dollar exchange rate), the real minimum wage was around
30-45 cents per hour throughout the study period. The highlighted parameters in Table 1
(the rest of the estimates can be found in the Appendix) indicate that an increase in the
minimum wage was accompanied by a decline in employment probability and part-time
job incidence, but an increase in hours worked for individuals who were still working.
Existing minimum-wage models cannot explain all three of these patterns simultaneously
(see Neumark and Wascher 2007 for an excellent review of minimum-wage studies).
Table 1: Employment and Part-time Probabilities and Hours of Work in Turkey
for Urban Females with Log Real Minimum Wage (1988TL)
Dependent Variable Employment Part-time Employment Log Hours
Method of Estimation Probit Probit OLS
 elasticity  elasticity 
Lagged Minimum Wage -1.018 -0.143 -1.437 -0.230
(0.207)** (0.029)** (0.539)** (0.086)**
Log Lagged Minimum Wage 0.205
(0.027)**
Post Secondary 2.480 0.756 1.021 0.204 -0.242
(0.046)** (0.012)** (0.188)** (0.045)** (0.025)**
For coe¢ cient estimates of all controls see the Appendix part II.
Standard errors in parentheses
: signicant at 1% signicance level. : signicant at 5% signicance level.
Another relevant factor is the length of the workweek. In most countries, part-time
positions tend to be low-paying, low-benet jobs frequently occupied by women. Some
women, especially married women, may prefer exibility of hours over higher pay when
looking for a job. For example, Falzone (2000) shows with U.S. data that part-time work
o¤ers an e¢ cient alternative for married women in the labor market when earnings are
not the only consideration. However, in Turkey, part-time jobs are di¤erent, as illus-
trated in Table 2. Specically, in the Turkish labor market, part-time workers earn on
average almost 3 times as much as full-time workers. Most part-time workers are uni-
versity graduates and high-productivity workers. The share of part-time workers was
31 percent among college-educated women in the 1988 Turkish Household Labor Force
Survey. Among women with less education, on the other hand, this gure was only 10 per-
cent. The summary statistics also show that the higher the years of schooling completed,
the lower the average number of hours worked per week. This interesting phenomenon
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can be explained with the model introduced in this paper; average part-time wages are
higher simply because there are almost no part-time jobs in the low-paying sectors of the
market. Putting it di¤erently, low-productivity workers cannot obtain part-time jobs, but
high-productivity workers can, creating this so called "part-time wage premium."
Table 2: Female Labor Force Participation in 1988 Data
Wages - Part-time versus Full-time Jobs
# of obs. mean st.dev. min. max. median
if h < 40 87 1.85 5.29 0.11 48.94 1.17
if h>=40 474 0.74 0.97 0.05 18.43 0.58
Share of Part-timers by Education
# of obs. % part-timers
college graduates 154 31.13
non-college graduates 407 10.03
Hours of Work by Schooling
# of obs. mean st.dev. min. max. median
primary school or less 189 42.79 9.03 15 84 40
middle school 35 42.48 4.68 40 58 40
high school 183 40.36 5.98 20 64 40
college or more 154 35.58 9.19 15 54 40
This is not the rst paper that calls attention to the link between the lack of part-
time jobs and the low female labor-force participation rate in Turkey. Baslevent (2001)
documents a negative correlation between part-time employment and female labor-force
participation. Moreover, Baslevent and Tunali (2005 ) point out that the absence of a
linear relationship between tax and benet payments and hours of work makes part-time
employees very undesirable in the Turkish labor market.
According to various OECD reports, Turkey is among the least exible labor markets
worldwide with respect to employment. The main sources of inexibility in this market are
the policies regarding nonwage monetary burdens associated with employment resulting
from the labor law that was in e¤ect between 1947 and 2003, roughly the time period I am
interested in. This paper captures the inexible nature of Turkeys economy and evaluates
the impact of the minimum wage on female employment through inexible working hours.
It is true that nonwage labor costs by themselves can create restrictions on the length
of the workweekand the model introduced in this paper captures thisbut the minimum
wage magnies these hours restrictions, resulting in a reduction in part-time jobs as well
as employment.
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3 Model
The model used in this paper builds on the labor supply model introduced in Mo¢ tt
(1982). In this model each worker faces a restriction on the lowest number of hours she can
work: her required minimum hours. She also chooses her desired number of hours, which
she can work only if her desired workweek is longer than her required minimum. If her
desired workweek is shorter than her required minimum, she is considered "constrained"
and has to choose between working more hours than she wants or not working at all.
I extend this base model by modeling the marginal productivity determination and let-
ting wages vary by the length of workweek. Because the per-hour xed cost of employment
decreases as the workweek gets longer, average productivity increases. Thus, employers
are willing to pay higher hourly wages for longer workweeks, which generates a full-time
wage premium within the model. The addition of increasing average productivity and
the zero-prot condition in the model leads to a di¤erent modeling of the constraints on
working hours.
In Mo¢ tts model, if the di¤erence between the required minimum and the desired
length of the workweek is greater than some estimated level, D, the worker chooses
not to work when constrained. This D is a function of the shape of the individuals
indi¤erence curves, but is treated as constant across workers in Mo¢ tts model. In my
model, instead of estimating such a constant, I allow for utility comparisons for workers
who are constrained, and choose the utility maximizing option from this constrained set.
Thus, I allow D to vary across individuals.
I will introduce the model in two subsections: the rst subsection analyzes how the
interaction of the minimum wage and xed costs results in constraints on hours. The
second subsection explains how supply-side decisions are a¤ected by these constraints.
Table 3 summarizes the notation used.
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Table 3: Notation
 : Marginal productivity of the potential worker
f : Fixed cost of employment per week per employee (in U.S. dollars)
wh : Hourly wage = average productivity

wh =
h  f
h
< 

wmin : Minimum hourly wage
h : Desired hours (length of workweek maximizing potential workers utility)
L : Optimal level of leisure (h*+L*=T=weekly time endowment)
h0 : Required minimum hours0BB@
Hours of work required for a worker to produce the value of
the minimum wage on average per hour. Required minimum hours is the
h that solves wmin =
h  f
h
that is h0 =
f
i   wmin
1CCA
h00 : Absolute required minimum hours
=
f

: This is also the required minimum hours when there is no minimum wage

3.1 Demand Side: Constraints on Hours of Work
Consider an economy where technology is linear and labor is the only input of production.
Each potential worker has a constant marginal productivity (). Given these assumptions,
rms will o¤er everyone jobs with working hours they optimally choose to supply (h) at
an hourly wage (wh) equal to their average productivity, which is equal to their marginal
productivity (wh = ).
Now, consider two individuals with di¤erent marginal productivity (a > b) but the
same level of desired hours. Any given rm will hire them both and pay hourly wages (wh)
equal to their average productivity, wha = a and whb = b respectively. However, if there
is a minimum wage in this economy (suppose it is set at a level between whb and wha), no
worker with an average productivity less than the minimum wage (b = whb < wmin) will
be o¤ered any job. Because average productivity is constant, there will be no constraints
on the hours worked by the individuals who are o¤ered jobs. That is, a worker with
productivity a can still work her desired level of hours. Nevertheless, an individual with
a productivity b will no longer be employed by anybody.
Suppose now there are costs associated with each job equal to f dollars per worker for
each workweek. As a result, each worker starts producing a surplus value for the employer
after the rst
f

hours. I call this "the absolute required minimum hours" and denote it
with h00. The key point in this model is the increasing average productivity: the cost
of employment will make a workers average productivity, as well as the hourly wage she
earns, dependent on the number of hours she works. This hourly wage is less than what
it is when there are no xed costs since now the total value of the workers production will
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be reduced by the costs associated with her employment 1. The average hours curve in
Figure 1 shows us the "menu" of jobs (dened as a pair of working hours and an hourly
wage) the worker will consider in her utility maximization.
However, minimum wage regulation is such that it does not take the existence of xed
costs into account and requires a constant hourly wage independent of the length of
the workweek (wmin)2. Therefore, when there are xed costs, minimum wage regulation
creates an interval of hours where the average productivity is lower than the minimum
wage for every worker. This results in restrictions on the minimum number of hours
each worker can work (h0). That is, some of the jobs (jobs with hours less than h0) in
the "menu" that the worker considers will no longer be o¤ered to her by the employers.
Solving the hourly wage equation for h where average productivity is equal to the minimum
wage gives
h0i =
f
i   wmin ; (1)
which is an increasing function of the xed-employment costs and the minimum wage, but
a decreasing function of the workers productivity. Figure 1 illustrates how the minimum
number of hours that a given worker needs to supply decreases as the productivity level
increases (a > c > wmin =) h0a < h0c). In other words, a worker with a higher
productivity will have more options on her "menu of jobs" with a wider range of hours.
 Hourly Wage/Marginal Productivity $
πa
wage/ hour for worker a
πc
wage/ hour for worker c
(minimum wage)
 0 Hours of Work
h00a h00b   h0a h0c
Figure 1
1wh =
h  f
h
< 
2In this paper, the minimum wage is set to be an hourly wage for two reasons. First, most of the
relevant literature works with datasets in which the minimum wage is measured hourly. Second, the
employment e¤ects implied by this model will be in the same direction but magnied if the minimum
wage was set in any other manner, such as a weekly or a monthly minimum wage.
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3.2 Supply Side: Participation Decision with Constraints on
Working Hours
Suppose that on the supply side of the labor market, there are individuals maximizing
the utility function U = U(Ci; hi ; Ai; 1i; 2i) choosing the amount of work hours they
want to supply (hi ) and the level of a composite market good they want to consume (C

i )
given their individual observable characteristics (Ai) and the unobservable heterogeneity
in terms of hours preference and productivity (1i; 2i).
Consumption
    Goods
   M+ wT-f G
F
M+ wmin T
E
     D      C B
A
T-h*high                                        T-h0 T-h*low T-h00 (=T-(f /w))                  T Leisure
Figure 2
If the potential worker wants to supply a higher number of hours than she is required as
a minimum, she will not be restricted. However, even a worker with a productivity level
higher than the minimum wage will face unemployment if she does not want to work a
long workweek (i.e., women who have a higher opportunity cost of working). Figure 2
demonstrates this situation, showing two workers with the same productivity  (slope
of the line CEG), which is higher than the minimum wage (slope of the line BEF ) 
but di¤erent levels of desired hours hhigh and h

low. An individual with desired hours
equal to hhigh will not be constrained by the demand side. However, an individual with
hlow will face the choice between working h0(corresponding to the corner labeled E) and
not working at all (the corner labeled B) since she will not be o¤ered her optimal job
any more. An individual with desired hours equal to hhigh will not be constrained by
demandside factors. However, an individual with hlowwill face the choice of working
h0(corresponding to the corner labeled E) and not working at all (the corner labeled B)
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because she will not be o¤ered her optimal job.
The above discussion shows that a minimum wage can have signicant employment-
reducing e¤ects when there are high xed costs. Moreover, these e¤ects are felt more
severely by low-productivity individuals because lower productivity implies a higher re-
quired minimum hours. Individuals who prefer shorter workweeks (i.e., individuals who
have a high opportunity cost) who supply fewer hours to the market will also be a¤ected
more by the minimum wage in this market.
4 Econometric Specication
In the model, there are workers who work their desired hours and workers who work their
required minimums. Moreover, there are three groups of nonworkers. The rst group
consists of the ones who willingly opt out of the labor market regardless of the minimum
wage. The second group includes the ones who choose not to work the long hours they
are o¤ered. The third group is made up of people who want to work but are not o¤ered
any jobs because their marginal productivity is less than the minimum wage. The main
econometric di¢ culty arises from the fact that it is not possible to observe which workers
are at their required lower bounds and which are working their desired hours. Moreover,
I cannot observe which nonparticipants are constrained and would like to supply positive
hours and which would not. I only know who is working, who is not working, and the
actual working hours for each worker. I assume the behavioral structure producing the
observed behavior and utilize the model to recover the parameters that maximize its t.
I start by assuming that everybody has the following utility function,
U(Ci; Li; Ai; i) =

2(T   Li)  1
22

exp

2 (0+2Ci + 3Ai + 1i)  1
2hi   1

;
which is subject to the following set of constraints3
Ci =Mi + ihi   if
Li + hi = T ,
3Ci =Mi + wihhi =) Ci =Mi +

ihi if
hi

hi =) Ci =Mi + ihi   if:
This budget constraint can also be used to model xed costs that are directly incurred by employees
facing a single wage o¤er () and choosing how much to work at the hourly wage net of the xed costs
(wh). With the production technology used in this paper,these two models will yield identical results
with the same interpretation.
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where Ai is a vector of demographic characteristics, Mi is non-labor income, Ci is the
composite good (the numéraire), Li is leisure and T is the xed weekly time endowment
that can be divided between leisure and work. i is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the
individual works and 0 if not. This "weird" utility function was chosen because it gives a
linear labor supply function, which is widely used in the literature. That is, conditional
on choosing to work a positive number of hours, the optimal number of working hours is
given by the following expression:
hi = T   Li = 0 + 1i + 2(Mi   f) + 3Ai + i1 . (2)
Restrictions 1 > 2hi and 2  0 guarantee quasiconcavity of the utility function and
its monotonicity in disposable income. Whereas 1 > 2hi implies that the compensated
wage e¤ect is greater than or equal to zero, 1; can be positive or negative (See Hausman,
1985 or Pencavel, 1986). The second constraint 2 6 0 assures that leisure is not inferior.
Marginal productivity is given by the following equation:
i = exp(Xi + i2) , (3)
where Xi represents individual productivity characteristics. The error terms 1 and 2
are assumed to be independently distributed as normals with means equal to zero and
standard deviations equal to 1 and 2; respectively.
If an individual desires to work a positive number of hours, has a marginal productivity
greater than the minimum wage, and has a higher utility from working her required
minimum hours than not working, she actively participates in the labor force. Otherwise,
she does not work. As stated earlier, I do not observe either h or h0. However, if the
individual is active in the labor market, I know hi, the observed working hours. Given
that, in this model, hi is either the desired number of hours or the minimum required
hours, I can use the conditions governing the participation decision to construct the
rules determining the choice of work hours. Figure 3 illustrates the regions regarding
participation behavior in the plane of desired and required minimum hours4.
As long as the individual desires longer workweeks than the minimum workweek that
she is o¤ered, she is not constrained by the minimum-hours requirement and she works her
desired number of hours. However, when a womans desired number of hours is positive
but less than the required minimum hours she is o¤ered, she is forced to choose between
not working and working the required minimum. She works h0 hours at minimum wage5
4See the rst section in the appendix for an illustration of the choice of hours using the utility function.
5Minimum wage is equal to the (minimum) hourly wage at the required minimum hours.
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only if it is more desirable to do so than not working. That is,
hi = h

i if h

i > h0 and i > w
min (I)6
= h0 if h0 > hi and U(hi = h0) > U(hi = 0) (II)
:
45O
Required Minimum Hours
(T,T)
Region III
     Wants to work but the
     required minimum is
too high
   h = 0
Region II
Region IV
                                    Do not want
                                          to work                                                 Works longer
h = 0                                             hours than the
desired level
    h = hmin
                                                                   Region I
                                                                   Not constrained
                                                Works desired hours
h = h*
                                          hmin = hmin
                                                             (0,0) Desired Hours
Region V
No job is offered
Has a productivity less than the minimum wage
h = 0
(hmin  , hmin  )
Figure 3
Similarly, there are three groups among the nonparticipants. The rst group is the
group of individuals who would supply positive hours if they were not constrained. They
are asked to work longer hours than they are willing to supply. When facing this choice,
they prefer not to participate in the labor force. On the other hand, for the second group
of nonparticipants, the desired workweek is less than or equal to zero. These are the
individuals who willingly choose not to work regardless of the minimum required number
6This constraint means that the worker will only be o¤ered a job with a positive wage if her productivity
is greater than the minimum wage. This constraint is imposed for technical reason during the optimization
since if i < wmin then h0 < 0 and is less than h: By imposing this constraint, I can substitute minimum
wage as a wage for the job that comes with minimum required hours since minimum wage is equal to the
(minimum) hourly wage at the required minimum hours.
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of hours. The last group of nonworkers consists of individuals who are undesirable in
the market when there is a minimum wage; that is, their productivity is lower than the
minimum wage. In summary,
hi = 0 if h0 > hi > 0 but U(hi = h0) < U(hi = 0) (III)
or if i > wmin but hi  0 (IV )
or if i < wmin (V ) .
Given these regions of participation, the probability of working hi = h hours can be
written as the probability of observing h either as hor as h0; that is,
Q =
0B@ Pr(hi = h
; hi > h0 > 0 jXi; Ai; 1; 2; wmin; Mi)
+Pr
"
h = h0; h0 > h

i > 0; U(hi = h0)
> U(hi = 0)j Xi; Ai; 1; 2; wmin; Mi
# 1CA : (4)
The probability of not working, on the other hand, is the combined probability of being
in regions III, IV or V and can be expressed as
q =
0B@ Pr(h0 > h

i > 0; U(hi = h0) < U(hi = 0)j Xi; Ai; 1; 2; wmin;Mi)
+Pr(hi = 0 ; i > w
minj Xi; Ai; 1; 2; wmin;Mi)
+Pr(wmin > i j Xi; Ai; 1; 2; wmin;Mi)
1CA . (5)
Thus7, the log likelihood function, logL; is
logL =
X
h>0
logQ+
X
h=0
log q (6)
7See the second section in the appendix for details of this derivation.
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5 Estimation
5.1 Data:
I have data from the Turkish Household Labor Force Survey (HLFS) for the years 1988,
1989, 1994, and 1999. This survey was conducted biannually (April and October) by the
State Institute of Statistics of Turkey from (October only) to and has been conducted
quarterly since 2000. In total, 14,000 to 23,000 households have been surveyed at each
data collection point, both from rural and urban areas. I have province information and
hourly wages from the 1988 October data but not from the later surveys. I used data
from all surveys for the simple probability model estimates and hours regressions. For the
structural estimation, because individual wage information is needed, only the 1988 data
are used8.
In the October 1988 round of the Turkish HLFS, 102,062 individuals residing in 22,320
households nationwide were surveyed. In this dataset, participation for women was around
18 percent in cities, very similar to the census results. Participation rates varied greatly
with education and marital status. There were signicant drops in participation rates
for individuals with less than a college education (e.g., 73 percent at the college level
and 8 percent for primary school graduates) and for married women ( 38 percent for
single women, 11 percent for married women). In the survey, nonworking women were
asked if they would like to work, and the percentage of women who were ready to start
working was higher among married and low-educated women (although only slightly in
some cases). This suggests that nonworking women tend to be the ones who are staying
out of the market due to demand-side restrictions.
For the empirical analysis, I use a subsample of 6,445 women between the ages of 20
and 55 who were married and living together with their husband in cities with 400,000 or
more people. Women in the sample either did not work the week preceding the interview
or were employed as wage and salary workers. I only use data for women who were
working at most one job and who were not currently enrolled in school, either full time
or part time. Table 4 gives the descriptive statistics for the women in my sample.
8Estimates provided in Table 2 are robust across years. Thus, I expect that the stuctural model
estimates will hold for other years too.
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics
Variables # of obs. mean st.dev. min. max. median
Hours worked (if working) 561 40.01 9.16 15 84 40
Hourly earnings
Minimum wages
# of children of aged 0-59 2804 1.38 0.61 1 4 1
# of children of aged 6-14 3753 1.86 0.94 1 6 2
Education 6445 4.66 3.671 0 15 5
Age 6445 34.62 9.16 20 55 34
Hours of Work by Schooling
# of obs. mean st.dev. min. max. median
primary school or less 189 42.79 9.03 15 84 40
middle school 35 42.48 4.68 40 58 40
high school 183 40.36 5.98 20 64 40
college or more 154 35.58 9.19 15 54 40
In this subsample, the mean level of education is about 5 years. Seventy-four percent of
the women interviewed have 7 or fewer years of schooling (the last degree they obtained
was for primary school). University graduates constitute 6 percent of the women and
about 37 percent of the workers in the subsample. The labor force participation rate for
this subsample is about 9 percent. These women work 40 hours on average. Eighty-three
percent of the working women work 40 hours or more, and only 5 percent work 20 hours
or fewer (8 percent of women work between 25 and 40 hours, and 9 percent work fewer
than 25 hours).
9conditional on having a child
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Table 5: Variable Denitions
Ai demographic variables
age between 20 and 55
age squared age squared/100
years of schooling 0 = no schooling
3 = literate but has no degree
5 = primary school
8 = middle school
11 = high school
15 = college or more
years of schooling squared years of schooling squared/100
young children number of children between ages 0-5
young children squared number of young children squared
older children number of children between ages 6-14
older children squared number of older children squared
Xi productivity variables
middle school dummy (0-1)
high school dummy (0-1)
college dummy (0-1)
potential experience age - years of schooling - 6
(6 is the age at schooling begins)
potential experience squared potential experience squared/100
Mi non-labor income
household incomeown labor income
number of household members
I use di¤erent educational indicators, family variables, and individual demographic
indicators as the explanatory variables in the estimation. Table 5 lists the variables used
in all steps of estimation with explanations. There are a few problems with the data; for
example, wages and a nonlabor income measure are not directly available. There is also
no record of asset income. I use the weekly value of per-member income of the household,
excluding womens own earnings as a proxy for the nonlabor income. I only have monthly
incomes recorded; thus, I divide the gures by four to obtain an approximate weekly
number. In the survey, individuals report their usual working hours per week and how
much they worked the week before the survey. However, they report how much they
earned for the month preceding the interview. I approximate the weekly labor income
using these gures, making sure that the individuals were working for the whole month
for which they report the income. Three observations that do not meet this criterion are
excluded from the sample used for the analysis.
The dataset is cross-sectional and the nominal level of the minimum wage is constant
across the country. I generate variations in the minimum wage using the province-level
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CPI10. I keep the prices in Ankara (the capital city) as the base and divide the minimum
wage in the other provinces with the ratio of their prices to the prices in the capital. This
measure reects the di¤erences in the real value of the minimum wage across individuals
even though they all face the same nominal level. I made the same adjustment to nonlabor
income and wage measures. I convert all values into U.S. Dollars using the average
Dollar/Turkish Lira exchange rate for October 1988, the month that the survey took
place.
I estimate the model using Maximum Simulated Likelihood (MSL). This method re-
places the actual probabilities dening the likelihood function with simulated probabilities.
The simulated probabilities are generated by a Logit-Smoothed Accept-Reject Simulator
(LS-AR Simulator) following Train(2003)11.
5.2 Results
Married womens time outside of the market is valued higher because the division of labor
in the household requires them to be the main producers at home in most cultures. Thus,
females of a given market productivity are expected to supply fewer hours of labor than
their male counterparts. These women are also expected to decide not participate in the
labor force if they would be required to work long hours at the jobs available to them. This
is what I observe in the present data. The share of housewives among nonparticipating
women is strikingly high in the Turkish data; Seventy-nine percent of women who do not
participate in the labor force state being a housewife as the reason for not doing so.
Household duties keep women at home when the labor market options are not attractive
enough. My estimates provide support for this not-so-new idea. Looking at Table 6 we
can see that having young children in the household decreases a womans desired weekly
work hours. Whereas having only one young child at the household results in a 6-hour
decrease in desired hours, having two young children results in a 10-hour decrease. The
e¤ect of having older children on hours choice is similar, but its magnitude diminishes as
the number of children in this age group increases in the household. The average woman
with a child between the ages of 6 and 14 wants to work about 3 hours fewer compared
to her counterpart with no children in this age range.
The estimates of the marginal productivity parameters suggest signicant economic
returns to education, especially at the college and high school levels. Everything else equal,
college-educated women earn about one hundred percent more per hour compared to
10I use 1995 prices, the earliest year for which CPI exists for all the provinces I have in the data.
11The description of the simulation process excluded in this version of the paper but can be pro-
vided/added upon request.
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women with no education. The wage return to a college education is more than double the
wage return to a high school degree (again compared to women with no education). This
partially explains the discrepancy between participation rates across di¤erent education
levels.
The mean of the productivity estimates is 54 cents for the working individuals. That is,
the average worker produces 54 cents worth of goods or services per hour. The distribution
of these productivity measures has a standard deviation of 17 cents, with values ranging
from 0.03 to 2.34 dollars for the entire sample. According to these estimates, 9 percent
of the women in the sample have a simulated productivity that is less than the minimum
wage, which ranges from 32 to 34 cents per hour across 14 cities.
The number of desired work hours decreases for nonlabor income, but the e¤ect is
not very signicant economically. In this case, nonlabor income approximated using the
labor incomes of the other family members in the household. The sum of family income
excluding the wifes income divided by the family size. Keeping this in mind, the estimate
for 2 suggests that by every hundred extra dollars the other family members earn per
person, the desired hours of a potential worker decreases by 3 hours per week.
Table 6: MSL Estimates
Desired and Required Minimum Hours estimate st.dev
Constant (0) 21.49 3.82
Wage (1) 4.81 1.01
Nonlabor income (2) -0.03 1.08E-3
Years of schooling 0.88 0.09
Years of schooling squared -3.55 0.65
Age 0.84 0.17
Age squared -1.67 0.25
Young kids -2.47 0.77
Older kids -3.49 0.42
Young kids squared -2.71 0.59
Older kids squared 0.52 0.17
Fixed employment cost (f) 5.38 0.26
Marginal Product
Constant -1.54 0.01
Middle school 0.20 0.01
High school 0.44 0.02
College 0.93 0.03
Potential experience 1.6E-3 3.03E-4
Potential experience squared -5.4E-5 5.23E-6
1 8.11 0.09
2 0.42 0.01
Log likelihood -3028
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The coe¢ cients for the age variables imply that desired hours increases up to age 33 and
declines thereafter. Such a pattern, in terms of hours worked, does not appear in the data.
However, we know that not all workers work their desired number of hours. According
to the estimation, about 40 percent of the workers in the sample are constrained to work
at the minimum number of hours. Given this, Figure 4 illustrates why we fail to observe
such a pattern with the hours data. The number of hours worked at the low and high ends
of the age distribution is still high due to the higher proportion of constrained workers
in those age groups. In other words, because both younger and older works have higher
numbers of desired hours, a smaller proportion of middle-aged workers are constrained to
the minimum number of hours.
Effect of Age on Desired Hours / Ratio of Constrained Workers by Age
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Figure 4
The estimate for 1 seems to be small, suggesting that a dollar increase in the wage
would increase the desired hours by 5 hours given the range of wage estimates. For
the average worker, one extra dollar per hour was equal to about a two-hundred-percent
increase in hourly wages. This is in line with the ndings of several papers on Turkish
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female labor market activity. Tunali (1997), for example, nds that the wage elasticity of
hours supplied is almost zero among Turkish women.
The xed employment cost is estimated to be about 5.40 dollars. As mentioned before,
an average worker works 40 hours per week and makes about 0.54 dollars per hour. In
this case, 5.40 dollars corresponds to about 25 percent of the workers weekly earnings.
About 31 percent of all labor costs in Turkey (in 1990) were nonwage payments12.
5.2.1 Participation Regions
The estimated participation rate from the model is 8.87 percent. Table 7 summarizes the
participation probabilities associated with the regions in Figure 3. According to these
estimates, 80 percent of all women are restricted in the sense that they want to supply
positive hours of work but either are not desired as workers or are constrained by a high
number of required minimum hours. Conditional on being a nonparticipant, about 25
percent of women wanted to work and are welcomed into the market but asked to work
more hours than they are willing to supply. About 60 percent of women are not o¤ered
any job.
Table 7: Participation Regions
Event Denition Probability
h > 0 participation 0.09
h = h working desired hours - Region I 0.04
h = hmin working required minimum - Region II 0.05
wmin< , h> 0, h = 0 required minimum too high - Region III. 0.25
wmin<, h< 0, h = 0 not want to work - Region IV 0.04
wmin> no job o¤er - Region V 0.62
5.2.2 Fitting the Hours Distribution
Table 8 reports the distribution of the estimated hours. In the simulated data, the average
workweek totaled about 41 hours. For the women working their required minimum hours,
the mean workweek was 47 hours long, and for women working their desired hours the
mean workweek was 35 hours.
Table 8: Distribution of Hours
mean st.dev. min max
estimated 40.61 13.52 8.54 89.67
h = h0 46.81 15.31 13.64 89.67
h = h 34.88 8.19 8.54 61.34
12TISK (Turkish Employers Unions Confederation) Website. www.tisk.org.tr
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Figure 5 graphs the simulated hours distribution and also shows the distributions for
the restricted and unrestricted workers. The relatively high concentration of workweeks
at around 30 to 45 hours can be considered a possible explanation for the concentration
of the hours distribution around 40 hours in the data.
Simulated Hours Distribution
Desired vs Required
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
13 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 53 55 57 59 61 63 65 67 69 71 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87
simulated hours - all workers required desired
Figure 5
6 Counterfactuals
Given the estimates and the data, I am able to simulate the participation and hours choices
under di¤erent minimum-wage policies. Moreover, I am able to see how the participation
and hours choices would have changed with the same minimum wage in a di¤erent eco-
nomic environment, in this case, a labor market with no employment costs. Based on the
estimates, I simulate several counterfactual scenarios and analyze the transitions across
labor-market groups under these alternative policies. Table 9 contains the participation
probabilities generated via the simulations for these counterfactuals.
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Table 9: Participation Regions under Counterfactuals
f = festimate, wmin= 0
h > 0 participation 0.48
wmin<, h< 0, h = 0 does not want to work 0.09
f = 0.5 * festimate, wmin= wmindata
h>0 participation 0.15
wmin<, h> 0, h = 0 required minimum too high 0.19
wmin<, h< 0, h = 0 does not want to work 0.04
wmin> no job o¤er 0.62
f = 0.5*festimate, wmin= 0
h>0 participation 0.75
wmin<, h< 0, h = 0 does not want to work 0.09
In the simulation, when the minimum wage is set to zero (in the presence of xed costs),
the amount of women working increases to 48 percent, whereas only 9 percent of women
are not working. The xed cost in this model represents not only technological burdens but
also policy-implied costs of employment. Thus, although it is not reasonable to think of an
environment without any xed employment costs, we can think of an environment without
the institutional costs imposed by the regulations, taxes, and so forth. The simulation
model suggests that 15 percent of women would participate in the labor market if xed
costs were 50 percent lower. If there were no constraints in the market, the simulations
show that about 60 percent of currently nonworking women would obtain jobs. This
would raise the total female labor force participation to 75 percent, about 9 times the
current estimated rate. A simulation without xed costs indicates that the minimum
wage alone explains 42 percent of this total increase. Similarly, a simulation including
xed costs but no minimum wage shows that xed costs accounted for only 7 percent
of the change. Thus, the interaction of the minimum wage with xed employment costs
accounts for most of the di¤erence.
These changes also a¤ect the distribution of working hours. Table 10 shows that the
mean, minimum, and maximum hours worked are lower in the counterfactual simulation,
indicating more women are working at the low end of the hours distribution. This supports
the claim that if there had been more part-time jobs available in the market, participation
would have been higher.
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Table 10: Counterfactual Distribution of Hours
mean st.dev. min max
f=festimate,wmin=0 31.91 7.78 10.28 68.62
f=f=0.5*festimate,wmin=wmindata 36.08 12.05 5.99 89.72
f=f=0.5*festimate,wmin=0 28.76 8.56 5.14 68.54
7 Conclusion
In this paper, I show that the interaction of minimum wages and xed costs of employ-
ment limits the availability of short workweeks for women, and as a result can cause a
shortage of part-time jobs. Thus, for su¢ ciently high employment costs, the institution
of a minimum wage a¤ects employment among all workers who prefer exibility in terms
of hours, regardless of the level of productivity. I estimated the model with Turkish data.
My estimates indicate that about 80 percent of all women in Turkey are restricted; they
wish to supply positive hours of work but either have lower than minimum-wage produc-
tivity and thus are not desired as workers or are constrained by the required minimum
hours in the market. The key parameter in the model is the xed cost of employment,
which is estimated to be about 5 dollars per week for each employee. The average worker
in the sample worked 40 hours per week and made about 54 cents per hour. The 5-dollar
xed cost thus corresponded to about 25 percent of average weekly earnings. Given that,
on average, 30 percent of all labor costs in Turkey represent nonwage expenses13 , this
estimate appears to be a good approximation of labor costs for the present sample.
With counterfactual simulations I show that with no constraints in the market, total
female labor force participation would increase nine fold. About 65 percent of these new
participants would hold part-time jobs. A simulation without xed costs indicates that
the minimum wage alone explains 42 percent of this total increase, and a simulation
including xed costs but no minimum wage reveals that xed costs accounts for only 7
percent of the change. These results support the claim that the impact of the minimum
wage is strongest when it is imposed in inexible market conditions.
There are several assumptions in the model that may be considered restrictive. For
example, in the current functional specication of the model, there is no place for a
nonmonotonic relationship between hours supplied and xed costs. Moreover, there is no
room for nonlinear responses to wages. Implications of the model for employment decisions
do not change if the technology is modied in order to allow alternative constraints and
wage structures. For example, an S-shaped hours-productivity relationship (Barzel, 1973;
Mo¢ tt, 1984), which is considered a more realistic approach, would lead to both lower
13SIS statistic
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and upper bounds for the length of workweeks acceptable to the employers. This would
strengthen the impact of the minimum wage on the level of employment, even without
the xed costs. In the data, the distribution of hourly wages by workweek is weakly
concave, which rejects the idea of a full-time wage premium. I take this as a sign that
the present model is a good choice for the studied environment. It implies that part-time
jobs will be in short supply and high-productivity workers will occupy the existing jobs.
Low-productivity workers will be constrained by having to work more hours. Thus, in this
environment, the part-time job market may have higher hourly wages on average than
the full-time job market. This is quite di¤erent from the markets that are explained with
S-shaped budget constraints.
Allowing constraints only on the minimum number of hours workers can work may also
seem limiting. However, an upper limit on working hours does not seem to be an issue in
the data. Moreover, unlike some other studies in the literature, I chose not to discretize
the choice set of hours because the main concern is not tting the distribution of observed
hours (mainly the spikes at certain lengths of workweeks, such as 40 hours) but under-
standing how important these constraints are in explaining the concepts of voluntary and
involuntary unemployment. I cannot capture the spikes of observed hours distribution
with these estimates. However, the model successfully ts the external margins of partic-
ipation. I also ignore the possible heterogeneity of xed costs due to the lack of variables
needed to identify such variation across workers.
This paper o¤ers a stylized model of employment costs. The model restricts the use of
information on employers because this information does not exist for nonworkers and thus
cannot be used to approximate the latent indices created for each individual. Estimating
the model only on workers can improve this aspect of the estimates. However, workers
constitute a minority in this dataset, which reduces the power of estimation. Thus, the
next step is to estimate the model with a dataset in which employment rates are higher,
such as the Current Population Survey. In the meantime, the dataset can be enriched by
the inclusion of single females and perhaps males. Married women make nonparticipation
decisions more easily than men and single women because they usually have a higher
nonlabor income on which to rely. It would be interesting to use the household as the
unit of analysis and estimate the impact that the minimum wage and market inexibilities
have on the intrahousehold division of labor. Like their wives, married Turkish men also
work long hours (on average 52 hours in my data). This is very high compared to many
other countries.
In this model productivity is perfectly observed by employers, and wages are based on
productivity. This kind of model of the labor market has been used before to consider
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minimum-wage impacts, dating back to Stigler (1946). The approach has been criticized
before because it does not account for the spike in the wage distribution at the minimum
wage (Card and Krueger, 1994). The model introduced in this paper does not su¤er from
this criticism. One implication of my model is that, despite being based on a Stiglerian
view of the labor market, the model still ends up with a spike at the minimum wage,
without raising anyones wages (e.g., an impressive 43 percent of all registered workers
are reported to be working for minimum wage in the Turkish data). This model also can
be used to explain the high rates of minimum-wage noncompliance if the alternative is
being unable to work, many workers would not complain if they are being paid below the
minimum wage for a job with exible hours.
APPENDIXES
I. UTILITY FUNCTION AND WORK DECISION
The following two graphs show the relationship between work hours and utility, holding
everything else constant for two di¤erent individuals. Both individuals have the same
characteristics, except for the number of young children. The x-axis crosses the y-axis at
U(h = 0), that is, at the utility level of not working.
This rst gure illustrates the utility function of an individual for whom not working
is superior to working at any h. This individual is not going to work at h* because this
local maximum implies a lower utility level than what he receives at h=0 .
Figure A-1
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The following individual has the same characteristics as the above individual except
for the number of young children. As you can see, the absolute required minimum is the
same for both individuals because only the productivity variables a¤ect the location of
this minimum. Unlike the case above, there is a positive h for this individual where her
utility is maximized. She will work h (point C) if the required minimum number of hours
is between points B and C. She will work her required minimum hours if the minimum
is between C and D (note that for these points utility is higher than what it is at h=0 ).
If the required minimum is more than D, she will not work because in that situation not
working yields a higher utility compared to working at hmin.
Figure A-2
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II. DERIVATION OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION
The individuals problem is to maximize
U = U(Ci; Li; Ai; i)
=

2(T   Li)  1
22

exp

2 (0+2Ci + 3Ai + 1i)  1
2hi   1

;
which is subject to the following set of constraints:
Ci Mi + (ihi   f)
Li + hi 6 T ;
where Ai is a vector of demographic characteristics, Mi is nonlabor income, Ci is the
composite good (the numeraire), Li is leisure, and T is the xed weekly time endowment
that can be divided between leisure and work.  is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the
individual works and 0 otherwise. The solution to this optimization problem gives
hi = T   Li = 0 + 1i + 2(Mi   f) + 3Ai + i1
as the desired hours equation. This model has two more latent indexes:
i = Xi + i2
hminij =
f
i   wminj
:
Then for a worker
hi = h

i (works desired hours) if
hi > h
min
ij and i > w
min
j ;
hi = h
min
ij (works required minimum hours ) if
0 < hi < h
min
ij and U(hi = h
min
ij ) > U(hi = 0) ;
hi = 0 (desires to work but is restricted) if
0 < hi < h
min
ij and U(hi = h
min
ij ) < U(hi = 0) ;
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hi = 0 (does not want to work but is o¤ered a job) if
hi  0 and i > wminj ;
and
hi = 0 (can not work-no job is o¤ered) if
i < w
min
j :
Then the log-likelihood function is:
logL =
X
h>0
logQ+
X
h=0
log q;
where
Q =
0BBBBBB@
 
k(hj Region I ; Xi; Ai; 1; 2; wminj ; Mi)
Pr( Region I j Xi; Ai; 1; 2; wminj ; Mi)
!
+ 
k(hj Region II; Xi; Ai; 1; 2; wminj ; Mi)
Pr( Region II j Xi; Ai; 1; 2; wminj ; Mi)
!
1CCCCCCA
and
q =
0B@ Pr(Region III j Xi; Ai; 1; 2; w
min
j ; Mi)
+Pr(Region IV j Xi; Ai; 1; 2; wminj ;Mi)
+Pr(Region V j Xi; Ai; 1; 2; wminj ; Mi)
1CA :
k(:) is the conditional probability density function of the hours-of-work variable given de-
pendent variables, nonlabor income, minimum-wage levels, and the unobserved preference
and productivity shocks.
Furthermore,
k(hjRegion I; :) =


(hi f)Xi wminj hip
(f hi)2 22



hi 0 (1 2f)Xi 2Mi 3Aip
(1 2f)2 22+ 21

1p
(1 2f)2 22+ 21
Pr(0 < hminij < h
; U(h = hminij ) > U(h = 0) j Xi; Ai; 1; 2; wminj ;Mi)
;
k(hjRegion II; :) =
[ (Z1)   (Z2)] (
wminj f
(hi   f)22 )  (
wminj
hi
hi   f   Xi
2
)
Pr(0 < hi < h
min
ij ; U(hi = h
min
ij ) > U(hi = 0) j Xi; Ai; 1; 2; wminj ;Mi)
;
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where
Z1 =
log

1 2hi
1

[(1 2hi) (1)]   220hi   32hiMi  223Aihi + 21hi   221wminj hi
22hi1
;
and
Z1 =
hi 0 (1 2f)Xi 2Mi 3Ai (1 2f)
24wminj hihi   f   Xi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1
;
and
q =
0BBBBBBBBBBBBB@
Pr
0BBBBBBBB@
26664
 
2h
min
ij   1

exp

2(0+2Mi+2hminij wminj +3Ai+1i) 1
2hminij  1

<
( 1) exp

2(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1

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+Pr
24 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j
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III. TABLE 1 - ALL COEFFICIENT ETIMATES
Table 1: Employment and Part-time Probabilities and Hours of Work in Turkey
for Urban Females with Log Real Minimum Wage (1988TL)
Dependent Variable Employment Part-time Log Hours
Method of Estimation Probit Probit OLS
 mfx  mfx 
Lagged Minimum Wage -1.018 -0.143 -1.437 -0.230
(0.207)** (0.029)** (0.539)** (0.086)**
Log Lagged Minimum Wage 0.205
(0.027)**
Married -0.576 -0.105 0.287 0.045 -0.083
(0.021)** (0.005)** (0.057)** (0.009)** (0.008)**
Number of children ages 6-14 0.019 0.003 0.134 0.021 -0.011
(0.010) (0.001) (0.032)** (0.005)** (0.005)*
Number of children ages 3-5 -0.143 -0.020 0.158 0.025 -0.022
(0.022)** (0.003)** (0.063)* (0.010)* (0.010)*
Number of children ages 0-2 -0.234 -0.033 0.015 0.002 -0.011
(0.026)** (0.004)** (0.075) (0.012) (0.012)
Primary School 0.363 0.049 -0.180 -0.027 0.010
(0.041)** (0.005)** (0.197) (0.027) (0.025)
Junior High 0.899 0.203 -0.105 -0.016 -0.023
(0.047)** (0.014)** (0.212) (0.030) (0.027)
High School 1.413 0.353 0.012 0.002 -0.085
(0.042)** (0.014)** (0.191) (0.031) (0.025)**
Post Secondary 2.480 0.756 1.021 0.204 -0.242
(0.046)** (0.012)** (0.188)** (0.045)** (0.025)**
Extended Family 0.062 0.009 -0.038 -0.006 0.008
(0.025)* (0.004)* (0.071) (0.011) (0.010)
Constant -1.202 -1.394 2.835
(0.087)** (0.275)** (0.142)**
Observations 45629 45629 5639 5639 5639
R-squared 0.16
Standard errors in parentheses
: signicant at 1% signicance level. : signicant at 5% signicance level.
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